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This paper examines relationships between constituency characteristics
and individual legislators’ behaviour in a parliamentary system. This kind
of “dyadic” representation has received considerable attention in the US,
particularly with the study of roll call voting. Outside the US, however,
the study of individual representatives’ behaviour has been more diffi-
cult. In many cases, information on individuals’ behaviour has been dif-
ficult to attain; moreover, in many countries there are relatively few
observable policy venues in which individual legislators have an oppor-
tunity for anything other than toeing the party line.
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Dyadic representation is nevertheless of some importance outside
the US, theoretically if not practically speaking. That is, even where it is
weak or difficult to measure, the strength or fragility of dyadic represen-
tation is a defining feature of any political system. Consider recent dis-
cussions of electoral change in New Zealand, British Columbia, and
Ontario ~all with parliamentary systems!, each of which had the strength
of the connection between representatives and geographic constituencies
as a central theme. And some parliamentary systems may in fact exhibit
a considerably stronger dyadic connection than past work has suggested.
Consider Anglo–American countries combining the strong party disci-
pline of a parliamentary system, likely dampening dyadic representa-
tion, with a single member plurality ~SMP! electoral system, identified
in the US context as the critical driver of the dyadic link. As in the US,
citizens in these systems vote for individual representatives, creating con-
ditions for a strong dyadic connection. Moreover, these citizens often vote
with the expectation that their elected member will at least in part rep-
resent their geographic constituency. Do these other SMP systems, in spite
of parliamentary institutions, exhibit dyadic representation? Put differ-
ently, does the party focus of a parliamentary system quash entirely the
candidate-oriented incentives of SMP elections?
This question is relevant not just to Canada, but to the larger com-
parative literature on the relationship between political institutions and
the nature and strength of democratic representation. The literature on
this topic is nonetheless rather sparse. To be sure, there is a growing body
of comparative work on roll call voting, but much of this work focuses
on party cohesion, or the relatively rare breakdown of cohesion ~for exam-
ple, Wilson and Wiste, 1976; Wood and Pitzer, 1982; Mughan and Scully,
1997; Kam, 2001; Hix, 2002!. Dyadic representation is thus portrayed as
quite limited. Roll call votes are not the only venue in which dyadic rep-
resentation can occur, however. This paper accordingly examines dyadic
representation outside both the US and the roll call voting contexts.
The analysis focuses on a model of oral questions in the Canadian
House of Commons, drawing on an exhaustive dataset of over 43,000
oral questions ~from 1983 to 2004!, combined with data on constituency-
level demographics and electoral outcomes. Questions, as an example of
individual legislative behaviour, are in our model driven by a combina-
tion of procedural, institutional and party factors, constituency interests,
and electoral instability. Results provide evidence of dyadic representa-
tion across several policy domains, an important finding given the party-
focused tone of the existing literature on parliamentary systems. The
effects of electoral instability—as a mediator of constituency interests—
provide complementary evidence that competition increases dyadic rep-
resentation by members of Parliament ~MPs!, in line with some of the
classic US literature and at odds with much of the existing literature on
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parliamentary systems. Before setting out our model, however, the fol-
lowing section reviews the relevant literatures on dyadic representation
and Question Period.
Dyadic Representation?
The representation of public preferences is one of the critical features of
representative democracy. Dahl’s line, “I assume that a key characteristic
of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to
the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” ~1971: 1–2!
is often cited for good reason; it nicely identifies the centrality of the
opinion–policy link in democratic theory.1
Pitkin’s work on political representation is also influential here. Her
“substantive” representation, in which representatives act “in the interest
of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” ~1967:209! has
become a defining feature of empirical work on representative democracy.
The means by which substantive representation comes to exist is
another matter. One critical question focuses on whether political repre-
sentation should occur at the level of individual representatives or the
system as a whole. There is a strong argument for the latter, that repre-
sentation, particularly substantive policy representation, is necessarily at
the system level. Policy is not the outcome of a single legislator, after
all, but an entire policy-making system ~see, for example, Hurley, 1982!.2
Even so, the relationship between an individual representative and
her or his geographic constituency is a lynchpin of single-member plu-
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rality ~SMP! political systems. Constituencies elect individuals, and there
is typically a reasonable and widespread expectation that these individ-
uals will represent the interests of their constituents. This kind of “dyadic”
~Weissberg, 1978! representation has motivated a vast body of work on
roll call voting in the US. The early literature—including Miller and
Stokes’s “Constituency Influence in Congress” ~1963!, Mayhew’s Con-
gress: The Electoral Connection ~1974!, Clausen’s How Congressmen
Decide ~1973!, and Kingdon’s Congressmen’s Voting Decisions ~1973!—
remains critical. And there is a considerable body of work confirm-
ing and extending these authors’ evidence that the voting behaviour of
representatives is, albeit to varying degrees, driven by constituency
interests.3
This notion of dyadic representation has nonetheless been given rel-
atively short shrift in parliamentary systems. In these systems, where the
legislature and executive are fused, the need for a government to hold
the confidence of the legislature can result in relatively strong party cohe-
siveness, or party discipline ~Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Huber,
1996!. The potential for representatives to act independently is accord-
ingly relatively limited. This is particularly true for Canada, where lead-
ers have considerable power to reward or punish MPs through their control
over the MPs’ career advancement opportunities and candidacy in future
elections ~Docherty, 1997; Savoie, 1999; Carty et al., 2000!. This further
enhances the executive’s supremacy over the legislature ~Atkinson and
Thomas, 1993!.4
Given that the Canadian system allows party leaders to dictate the
behaviour of MPs, and the executive to dictate what will be legislated by
the House, the Canadian literature has been heavily focused on institu-
tional structure as the key factor that explains governance ~Mallory, 1971;
Stewart, 1977; Franks, 1987!. The system is regarded as being heavily
centralized, leaving little space for any meaningful policy role by MPs
~Savoie, 1999!; to the extent that MPs have an independent role, it may
be most evident in closed-door caucus meetings where party policies are
established. In most cases in which MPs receive specific attention for
their potential roles as individuals, the story is generally one of institu-
tional constraints ~Franks, 1987; Docherty, 1997!.
That MPs are rarely viewed as having represented their constituency
is readily evident in polling results ~for example, Anderson and Goodyear-
Grant, 2005!. Clarke and Kornberg, ~1992! attribute opinion to the insti-
tutional constraints described here, as well as the comparatively short
parliamentary careers of Canadian MPs during which it is difficult to
build a reputation for responsiveness. There are nevertheless hints in work
by Kornberg and colleagues that MPs have an interest in something other
than toeing the party line. Their interviews suggest that many Canadian
MPs are genuinely interested in affecting policy—motivated by both their
566 STUART SOROKA, ERIN PENNER AND KELLY BLIDOOK
own interests and those of their constituency ~see Kornberg 1966, 1967;
Kornberg and Mishler, 1976; also Atkinson, 1978!.
Kornberg’s findings are echoed in more recent work, which sug-
gests both that many MPs give a high priority to constituency concerns
~for example, Docherty, 1997!, and that this behaviour can pay off in the
form of a “personal vote” ~Cain et al., 1987; Blais et al., 2003!.5 Simi-
larly, Norton ~1994! suggests that UK MPs have increasingly felt a pres-
sure to act on behalf of their constituency. Historically speaking, UK MPs
rarely participated in Question Time; now many propose the allowable
maximum number of questions.6
To be clear, it is still the case that most work on parliamentary sys-
tems emphasizes the strength of parties. MP interviews suggest the
possibility of dyadic representation, but empirical evidence of this
representation—particularly in the Canadian context—is virtually nonex-
istent.We accordingly know very little about the nature and scope of dyadic
representation in parliamentary systems. The current research is aimed at
filling at least part of this gap. We are on the one hand agnostic but inter-
ested; even if dyadic representation is very low, we would like to find
empirical evidence that this is the case. But, on the other hand, we also
believe there are good reasons to expect a certain degree of individual
behaviour from MPs.
First, Canada’s SMP system provides a strong electoral incentive for
constituency representation. The possibility of individual electoral vic-
tory, despite party electoral defeat, as well as considerable local control
over the nomination process, creates conditions in which it may be ben-
eficial for a candidate to cultivate an image or message shaped by local—
and not party—concerns ~Carey and Shugart, 1995; see also Strom, 1997;
Cain et al., 1987!. Indeed, recent work on constituency service finds that
representatives in single-member systems ~including Canadian MPs! are
more likely to say they have a constituency focus than are representa-
tives in multi-member systems ~Heitshusen et al., 2005!.7 In short, just
as in the US, the Canadian SMP system creates a strong incentive for
representatives to demonstrate active, constituency-focused behaviour in
Parliament. Second, the Canadian legislative process provides a number
of venues, outside the largely party-driven legislative votes, in which
dyadic constituency representation may be manifest.8 Oral Question Period
is one such venue.
Question Period?
Question Period is the most visible part of the Canadian Parliamentary
process. Indeed, for most Canadians, Question Period is Parliament. It
provides a summary indication of those issues most salient to Canadian
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elected officials; it is a venue for position taking on the part of Govern-
ment and Opposition members alike; and last, but certainly not least, it
plays a starring role in nightly newscasts.9
Even so, many will ask whether Question Period really matters. It is
not policy making; it is far more symbol than it is substance; and even
this most visible part of the parliamentary process is, generally speak-
ing, not very visible to the average Canadian citizen. Let us begin by
noting, then, that for Question Period to be valuable for this particular
study, we do not require that it have a consistent effect on policy out-
comes. The idea of substantive representation assigns considerable impor-
tance to the political process, and not just to political outcomes ~Pitkin,
1967!. Relatedly, Mayhew argues that “politicians often get rewarded for
taking positions rather than achieving effects” ~2001:251; see also 1974!.
To the extent that MPs pursue personal votes in the Canadian context,
the same dynamic may well be true. Indeed, “position taking” in Cana-
dian parliament may matter a great deal. An MP’s actions need not directly
affect policy in order for there to be incentives to represent constituency
interests in oral questions.
That said, there are isolated instances of Question Period having a
direct effect on political and0or legislative outcomes.10 Existing research
also demonstrates a long-term causal relationship between Question Period
and media content on some issues ~Soroka, 2002a, 2002b! and argues
for the significance of oral questions in politics and policy making more
generally ~for example, Crimmins and Nesbitt-Larking, 1996; Howlett,
1998!. Institutional scholars also suggest that there may be an indirect
effect of Question Period on political outcomes. Question Period pro-
vides a venue in which Opposition parties can hold the Government to
account, criticize Government policies and suggest alternatives, gain expe-
rience, and demonstrate their potential as alternatives to the current gov-
ernment ~for example, Franks, 1987; Docherty, 1997; outside Canada,
see also Chester and Bowring, 1962; Franklin and Norton, 1993!. The
effect of QP may thus be largely anticipatory—Governments will antici-
pate pressure and competition in QP and legislate accordingly.
Even so, the direct influence of oral questions on legislative out-
comes does not really matter for our purposes. Rather, what matters is
that Question Period ~1! is seen by MPs as an opportunity to publicly
take a position on a given issue, and ~2! provides an opportunity for MPs
to actually do so. Regarding the former, that it is possible to signal an
issue interest through oral questions requires little justification; whether
questions are sufficiently public is perhaps another matter. Questions are
recorded in Hansard, of course, and broadcast on CPAC, Canada’s par-
liamentary news channel. Both are clearly “public,” though of course nei-
ther has a large audience. Oral questions are used regularly in media
reports, however. Where newspapers are concerned, identifying the prom-
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inence of Question Period is rather simple: over the twenty-year period
of this study ~1984–2004!, the Globe and Mail published 2,025 articles
that name Question Period directly.11 This translates to almost two direct
mentions per week, and likely underestimates the role Question Period
plays in media coverage of the House since it captures only those arti-
cles that name Question Period directly. That is, it completely ignores
the ~likely! possibility that an oral question affects the topic of a news
story, which then does not cite the question directly.
In addition, MPs themselves regularly advertise their oral questions
in their constituency literature and, more recently, on their websites. The
latter are of course readily accessible. As of July 2008, 70 per cent of
Opposition MPs have their own regularly updated websites; of those, 70
per cent directly mention ~and in most cases list verbatim! oral questions
that the MP has asked in the House.12 Overall, Question Period seems
sufficiently public to make it a worthwhile venue for “position taking.”
But are MPs provided an opportunity to actually do so? Let us note
first that the Canadian Question Period is a relatively unique institution.
It is one of the very few that allows MPs to ask questions of ministers
without any advance warning.13 That said, MPs can by no means ask
questions on whatever they want, whenever they wish. Question Period
lasts for 40 minutes each day, and questions are allocated mainly to Oppo-
sition parties based on their size in the House, with a few remaining ques-
tions for Government MPs. Parties plan their questions—both topics and
speakers—at morning meetings. The exact process by which questions
are selected varies across both parties and leaders. In some cases, ques-
tions ~and speakers! are selected by the full caucus, with input from many
party members; in others, questions are selected by a few elite party mem-
bers, based on a combination of party interests and backbenchers’ prior-
ities or concerns. In either case, in order to ask a particular question, an
MP has to get it approved by some of their fellow party members. None-
theless, if not in a single day then over time, parties will typically have
enough questions to both accommodate the party’s concerns as well as
those of some individual MPs. And even with these limitations, Ques-
tion Period presents more opportunity for individual behaviour by MPs
than do the more tightly controlled legislative votes. Interviews with MPs
suggest exactly this: MPs will try to find space for constituency repre-
sentation in their oral questions.14
There is reason to believe that Question Period will capture, if it
exists, a certain degree of dyadic representation—symbolic representa-
tion ~position taking! if not substantive representation ~directly impact-
ing policy!. That said, there is one additional limitation to Question Period
as a venue for study in the present case: it is limited in its ability to
reflect the constituency concerns of Government members, since most
questions are allocated to Opposition parties ~discussed in more detail
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below!. This does not preclude dyadic representation, of course, but it
does mean that the representation we find here is only part of the story:
dyadic representation by governing Cabinet members will not be cap-
tured very well in Question Period. Even so, Question Period is an impor-
tant, and quite visible, policy venue, one that can affect policy debate if
not policy itself, and one that can be of considerable importance to an
MP looking to publicize a particular issue. We should not underestimate
the importance of symbols in legislative politics ~for example, Edelman,
1964, 1985!. Nor should we underestimate the importance of “position
taking” by representatives seeking re-election.
Modeling Dyadic Representation in Question Period
The focus here is whether and to what extent MPs’ oral questions are
motivated by constituency interests. Ideally, MPs’ behaviour could be
linked to constituency policy preferences derived from public opinion
polls. These data are not available at the constituency level, however, so
this work uses surrogates. When looking at attention to defense issues,
we use a very simple measure: the existence of a military base in the
MP’s constituency. When looking at debt0taxes and social welfare, we
use a proxy for constituency preferences based on recent electoral results.
Both methods have been used in past US work ~for example, Pool et al.,
1965; Weber et al., 1972; Weber and Shaffer, 1972; Nice, 1983; Erikson
and Wright, 1980!; both suffer reliability and validity problems ~see espe-
cially Erikson et al., 1993!. These problems are partly minimized here
by focusing on relatively simple issue domains. These issues’ emphasis
in Canadian Parliament is, we believe, rather clearly connected with ~a!
the interests of those employed by ~or close to those employed by! the
military, or ~b! generally conservative or liberal policy preferences, as
captured using electoral data.
This argument is developed further below, alongside a statistical
model appropriate for gauging dyadic representative behaviour in the
Canadian House of Commons. The model includes these constituency-
level variables, alongside a battery of variables meant to capture the insti-
tutional constraints or incentives likely to affect the number of questions
an MP asks in Parliament. In short, we expect the number of questions—
regardless of topic—to be driven by ~1! a combination of Government
versus Opposition and backbench versus cabinet status, and ~2! party size
in the House. In addition, the number of questions on particular topics
will be affected by ~3! changes in issue salience across Parliaments and
parties, ~4! constituency interests, and ~5! electoral instability. We describe
these variables, and our expectations, in more detail below. First, how-
ever, we introduce the dependent variables.
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Our dependent variables are drawn from a content analytic database
of all oral questions asked in the House of Commons from mid-1983
~the last Trudeau government! to 2004 ~the end of the last Chrétien gov-
ernment!. The database includes 43,426 oral questions, spanning five Par-
liaments ~32nd to 37th!. All questions were coded by topic ~and subtopic!,
using codes are drawn from the US Policy Agendas project ~see, for exam-
ple, Baumgartner and Jones, 2003!.15 The coding scheme is quite elabo-
rate, including 25 major topic codes and over 100 subtopic codes. The
analyses below nevertheless rely on four relatively simple dependent
variables—the number of questions asked by each MP in each Parlia-
ment on:
• all issues combined
• defense, including military intelligence, arms control, defense alli-
ances, and military installations
• the federal debt and deficit, and taxation, including tax policy and
reform
• social welfare, including food stamps, poverty and assistance for low-
income families, elderly assistance programs, and social services.16
Debt and taxes are of course separate issues, though we combine them
here because these were the two central “right” issues for the period.17
Debt0taxes thus stands in contrast to social welfare, the quintessential
“left” issue. Note that our data capture only issue mentions, not the tone
or direction of questions. As we shall see, this means that when connect-
ing questions with our measures of constituency preferences we assume
that ~a! debt0taxes questions are largely anti-debt0taxes, and ~b! welfare
questions are largely pro-welfare. These assumptions are in part tested
below when we look at the relationship between issue attentiveness and
partisanship. Our own qualitative review of the data suggests that a vast
majority ~roughly 85 per cent! of social welfare questions are clearly left-
leaning, though there is more variance in debt0taxes questions ~where
roughly 75 per cent are clearly right-leaning!. To the extent that our sim-
ple measure of issue attentiveness does not capture the direction of com-
ments, however, we expect it to dampen rather than enhance our findings:
that is, measurement error in this regard is likely to lead to a more con-
servative estimate of the dyadic relationship. And our loss in detail is
hopefully compensated for in volume—namely, the use of a reliable,
exhaustive dataset covering twenty years of legislative behaviour.
For our purposes, then, we collapse these data so that the unit of
analysis is members of Parliament ~MPs!. There is one observation for
each MP in each Parliament.18 Given that we have data from six Parlia-
ments, and there are roughly 300 ~give or take 20!MPs in each, our sam-
ple size is 1804.
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The dependent variables are “count” variables, and our regression
analysis accordingly relies on a negative binomial regression model
~NBRM!. This estimation procedure is more suitable than OLS for count
outcomes, typically characterized by ~a! only positive values, ~b! many
zeros, and ~c! a long right-hand tail.19 We do not wish to spend too much
time on the details of NBRMs here.20 The general model is however as
follows:
m ip tip  $exp~b0 b1 xip1 b2 xip2 +++ bk xipk «i !% tip , ~1!
where m ip is the expected number of questions asked by an individual
MP i for a single day in Parliament p; and m ip tip is the expected count
over exposure time tip—the number of days for which an MP i could ask
questions in Parliament p ~accounting for the fact that MPs will be able
to ask more questions in a longer Parliament than in a shorter one!.21
This count is a function of various independent variables ~bx!, an error
term «,22 as well as “exposure time.”23 In the NBRM, an exponential
function ensures that predicted values will be non-negative; estimation is
undertaken by maximum likelihood.
We present our hypotheses and variables in tandem below. In short,
we expect oral questions to be affected by two sets of variables: one set
of mainly institutional controls affecting the number of questions an MP
asks, regardless of topic, and another set of variables linked to particular
topics, and capturing constituency representation by MPs. The first set is
as follows:
1. Government Versus Opposition, and Cabinet Versus
Backbench Member
Unlike other parliamentary systems where Government members use ques-
tions to solicit information from other Government ministers, Canadian
Government members rarely ask questions. Indeed, governing parties are
allotted very few oral questions; those that are asked are typically asked
by backbenchers rather than ministers. Where the Opposition is con-
cerned, in contrast, backbenchers tend to ask fewer questions. Instead,
members of each party’s “shadow cabinet” —which became more for-
malized ~for example, listed and publicized! in the 35th Parliament—
tend to ask more questions, particularly those related to the ministry for
which the member is a critic. The result is that the expected number of
questions varies with membership ~or not! in Government, and whether
or not they have a Government or Opposition portfolio. In our data, for
instance, Government cabinet members ask an average of 3.9 questions
in a single parliamentary session;24 Government backbenchers ask an aver-
age of 7.8; Opposition backbenchers ask an average of 45.6; and Oppo-
sition shadow cabinet members ask an average of 57.6.
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In our model of all questions combined, then, we include binary
variables for ~1! Opposition shadow cabinet member, ~2! Opposition back-
bencher, and ~3! Government backbencher. Controlling for the other fac-
tors in the model, we still expect the former to ask the most questions;
we still expect those in the comparison ~residual! category, Government
cabinet members, to ask the fewest questions. When we consider the num-
ber of questions on specific topics, we break the first category into two
variables: ~1a! Opposition shadow cabinet member, with a portfolio on
the relevant topic ~for example, defense!, and ~1b! all other Opposition
shadow cabinet members. We expect that all shadow cabinet members
will ask more questions than backbenchers, but the Opposition defense
critic, for instance, will be particularly likely to ask questions on defense.
2. Party Proportion
Oral questions are allocated to opposition parties roughly in proportion
to their size in the House; that is, a larger opposition party will receive
more questions than a smaller opposition party. Accordingly, the models
include a variable for the number of seats an MP’s party has in Parlia-
ment, as a proportion of all opposition seats. ~This variable is equal to
zero for all Government MPs.! Party proportion will not have a simple,
linear effect on the number of questions asked, however. Initially, as party
size ~and, consequently, proportion of questions! increases, an MP’s oppor-
tunity to ask questions should increase. This opportunity may increase
more slowly, however, and eventually decrease, as the party reaches a
certain critical size. This is a simple case of diminishing returns: as the
number of people in a party increases, demand for questions will be
greater, and the likelihood that any one individual asks many questions
starts to decrease. This is tested with the inclusion of both the linear and
quadratic forms of party proportion, with the expectation that the first
coefficient will be large and positive, and the latter will be small and
negative.
Party size, alongside Government0Opposition and cabinet0backbench
status, should affect the number of questions asked by all MPs, regard-
less of topic. A second set of variables should affect the number of ques-
tions asked on particular topics. These are as follows.
3. Parliaments and Parties
The number of questions on a given topic will vary across both parlia-
ments and parties, based on a topic’s salience either over time or across
partisans, respectively. A set of binary variables is accordingly included,
accounting for the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th and 37th parliaments. The 33rd
Parliament ~the first full parliament in our dataset! is the reference cat-
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egory. Models also include a set of binary variables for the Progressive
Conservatives ~PC!, New Democratic Party ~NDP!, Reform0Canadian
Alliance ~CA!,25 and Bloc Quebecois ~BQ!; the Liberals are the refer-
ence category. Any systematic differences in issue salience across par-
ties or over time will show up in these variables.
4. Constituency Interests
Most important for our test of dyadic representation is the effect of con-
stituency interests. As described above, we capture these preferences in
two ways. When looking at questions on defense, we capture constitu-
ency interests using a simple binary variable equal to one for all constit-
uencies in which there is a military base. In short, we expect that a military
base increases the salience of defense issues in a constituency. This has
been found to be true in the US ~Bartels, 1991!; it seems reasonable to
expect the same effect in Canada.
When looking at questions on debt0taxes and welfare, we identify
constituency interests using the distribution of the vote in the last elec-
tion.26 Doing so captures a more general partisan preference—essentially,
a left0right ideological disposition—for each constituency using party vote
shares. A similar approach has been used in some past US work ~for
example, Nice, 1983; Erikson and Wright, 1980!. The Canadian multi-
party case is slightly more complicated than the two-party case in the
US, but things can be simplified somewhat using a measure in which the
vote share for each party in the last election is multiplied by that party’s
placement on a left0right scale, as follows:
Partisan Preference  ~VoteshareNDP 1!
 ~VoteshareBQ 1!
 ~VoteshareLib  0!
 ~VotesharePC  .5!
 ~VoteshareReform 1!. ~2!
The particular measure places the NDP and BQ one unit lower than
~or left of! the Liberals, the Reform Party one unit higher ~or to the right!,
and the PC Party midway between the Liberals and Reform. These ideo-
logical weights capture the structure of the Canadian party system from
1993 onwards; before 1993, the measure is adjusted somewhat: there is
no BQ or Reform Party, and, in the absence of another party on the right,
the PC vote share is weighted at 1, one full unit right of the Liberals.
These are relatively simple weights, but they are supported by exist-
ing work on party ideological placements. The results of Benoit and
Laver’s elite interviews ~2006! show the NDP and Reform roughly the
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same distance on either side of the Liberals, the PCs between the Liber-
als and Reform, and the BQ close to the NDP.27 Similarly, Budge and
others’ content analysis of party platforms finds the NDP and Reform
roughly equidistant from the centrist Liberals ~2001!; those data also cap-
ture the leftward shift in the PC party once Reform emerges.28 Roughly
the same ideological distribution is also evident in voters’ assessments
of Canadian parties.29
The resulting measure is equal to 1 if all votes go to Reform0CA ~or
the pre-1993 PCs!; equal to 1 if all votes go to the NDP; and some-
where between as votes are distributed across the parties ~as they always
are!.30 In our data, the distribution is close to normal, and centred just
right of centre. This is expected, given that the PCs formed the Govern-
ment from 1984 to 1993, and the combined totals for the two right-
leaning parties exceeded those of the left-leaning parties in the 1993 and
following elections.
This measure greatly simplifies a relatively complicated Canadian
party system. Nevertheless, it likely captures the most important differ-
ence across constituencies for our purposes: the extent to which a con-
stituency tends to be left- or right-leaning, as identified by the most recent
electoral results.31 Partisan preference is thus included as our measure
of constituency interests in models of debt0taxes and welfare questions.
If constituency matters, even controlling for party, MPs from more left-
leaning constituencies should be less likely to focus their attention on
reducing both the debt and taxes, and more likely to address social wel-
fare issues. The opposite should be true for MPs from right-leaning con-
stituencies, ceteris paribus.
5. Electoral Instability
Even if constituency interests are correlated with MPs’ behaviour, it
remains possible that this apparently constituency-driven behaviour is not
so much active representation as it is a product of electorates success-
fully electing MPs who are demographically or ideologically representa-
tive of the constituency. That is, it is hard to distinguish between ~a! an
MP who pays attention to tax breaks because she or he represents a con-
stituency with many wealthy citizens, and ~b! an MP who pays attention
to tax breaks because she or he ~or someone in their family! is wealthy.
Practically speaking, this may not matter very much—in either case, con-
stituency interests are being represented in Parliament. Insofar as we are
interested in gauging the extent of active representation in a party-focused
parliamentary system, however, the issue is of some importance.
One way to find evidence of active representation is to search for
effects of electoral instability.32 If acting in a representative fashion
increases an MP’s chance at re-election, then we may find that those more
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concerned about losing the next election are more active in representing
their constituency. Finding evidence of this would provide some evi-
dence that behaviour in Question Period is motivated by constituency
rather than MP policy preferences. More generally, it would also provide
comparative evidence of the “electoral connection” ~Mayhew, 1974! that
makes dyadic representation worth exploring in Canada in the first place.
Just as an SMP system provides a stronger incentive for dyadic represen-
tation than a fixed-list PR system, a more hotly contested constituency
should motivate an MP to follow more closely the interests of her or his
constituents.
This possibility is tested below in two ways. An initial test examines
the degree to which the number of questions on all topics is driven by
the share by which a candidate won their constituency in the last elec-
tion; the relevant variable is win margin, the percentage of votes cast for
the winner minus the percentage of votes cast for the second-place can-
didate. The expectation here is that MPs will ask more questions when
they are more concerned about re-election, that is, when win margin is
small. The coefficient for win margin should thus be negative. A second
test uses an interaction between win margin and the relevant measure of
constituency interests. This interactive effect should also be negative: con-
stituency interests should be positively correlated with MPs’ behaviour,
but this connection should weaken as electoral instability increases. In
short, MPs should exhibit a greater degree of representation when they
feel their seat is at stake; remove political competition, and representa-
tion declines.
Results
Before moving to the multivariate model, we review some simple de-
scriptive statistics in Table 1. The table shows the average number
of questions asked by Opposition MPs ~per Parliament!, for each of
the three issue areas. The data are broken down, first by party and
then by the relevant constituency characteristics. In the first panel, for
instance, we see that the average Liberal MP asks roughly 2.7 defense-
related oral questions in a given Parliament; the average PC MP asks
2.3; and so on. In short, there are no sharp party differences for this
issue. When we look at the mean number of questions for MPs with or
without a military base in their constituency, however, a sharp differ-
ence emerges. MPs without a military base in their constituency ask 2.7
questions; MPs with a military base ask an average of 5.0.33 Even with-
out the multivariate setup, there is a clear connection between constitu-
ency characteristics and MP attentiveness to defense issues in oral
questions.
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Welfare questions show similar differences across the relevant prox-
ies for constituency interests. MPs with constituencies showing left-
leaning partisan preferences ask almost three times as many questions as
MPs with constituencies showing right-leaning partisan preferences.34 Of
course, when partisanship is not controlled for, this partisan preference
measure largely captures inter-party differences; it is by definition highly
related to the partisanship of the elected MP. We accordingly include one
additional proxy for constituency interests: the constituency-level
unemployment rate, drawn from the census closest to the year in which
the MP was elected. The difference between comparative high and low
unemployment constituencies is relatively small, but in the expected direc-
tion: MPs representing constituencies with unemployment rates above the
median do indeed ask more welfare questions.35 That said, it is partisan-
TABLE 1
Partisanship, Constituency Characteristics and Oral Questions
Mean # Questions ~N!
Defence





Military Base No 2.738 ~686!
Yes 5.016 ~63!
Debt/Taxes





Unemployment Below median ~low! 2.827 ~404!
Above median ~high! 2.446 ~36!
Preferences Below median ~left! 2.576 ~422!
Above median ~right! 2.733 ~345!
Welfare





Unemployment Below median ~low! 0.579 ~404!
Above median ~high! 0.799 ~363!
Preferences Below median ~left! 0.934 ~422!
Above median ~right! 0.377 ~345!
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ship that matters most to attentiveness to welfare issues: the average NDP
candidate asks 1.2 questions per Parliament, while the average Reform0CA
MP asks .03. ~Note that this gap supports the supposition that most wel-
fare questions are indeed pro- as opposed to anti-welfare.! The other par-
ties are distributed roughly as we would expect, save for the Liberals
who seem to ask a relatively high number of welfare questions ~indeed,
more than the NDP!. This distribution is a consequence of the size of the
Liberal party during their time in Opposition. During this time, the Lib-
erals occupied, on average, 61 per cent of the Opposition benches; the
NDP averaged just 22 per cent. Liberals clearly had considerably more
opportunity to ask questions.
Debt0taxes questions show markedly less structure across parties
and demographics. The party differences that do exist ref lect when
parties were in Opposition as much as anything else: the Liberals were
in Opposition during the debates over the Goods and Services Tax leg-
islation; Reform0CA led the charge over the debt; and in both cases the
NDP and BQ could not completely ignore the major issues of the day.
The difference between MPs representing low- and high-unemployment
constituencies is in the direction we might expect, but statistically insig-
nificant. That said, the assertion that wealthier constituents will be more
concerned about debt and taxes is rather tenuous, and we do not expect
very much here. The difference across left- and right-leaning constitu-
encies is similar. To the extent that there is a link between attentiveness
to debt0taxes and constituency interests, we will have to rely on a multi-
variate setup to reveal it.
Results for the multivariate models, then, are presented in Table 2.
In the first column, the total number of questions ~all topics! is modelled
as a function only of Government versus Opposition status, portfolio ver-
sus backbencher status, and win margin.36 The effects of portfolios and
Government status are significant and in the expected direction. All MPs
ask more questions than Government members with portfolios ~mem-
bers of cabinet!; Opposition MPs with portfolios ~in shadow cabinets!
ask the most questions. Interpretation of the raw NBRM coefficients is
rather difficult, so consider the following interpretations, based on the
exponentiated coefficients: a government backbencher asks roughly 1.9
times as many questions as does a member of cabinet; an Opposition
backbencher asks 4.7 times as many questions; an Opposition shadow
cabinet member asks 6.4 times as many questions.
Party size also matters. The linear version of party proportion is pos-
itive, and the quadratic version negative, as expected. The coefficients
suggest the following: for a backbench Opposition member, an MP whose
party makes up 20 per cent of the Opposition has an expected count of
43.2; with a party making up 30 per cent of the Opposition, their expected
count is 52.4; with 40 per cent of the Opposition, their expected count is
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TABLE 2




All Defense Debt0Taxes Welfare
Defense Base .576*
~.342!
Defense Base * Win Margin .180
~1.337!
Partisan Preference 3.166** 5.062***
~1.274! ~1.632!
Partisan Preference * Win Margin 4.254*** 2.995
~1.486! ~2.097!
Win Margin .738*** .319 .284 .804
~.252! ~.482! ~.494! ~.668!
Party Proportion .055*** .053* .089*** .004
~.008! ~.032! ~.034! ~.047!
Party Proportion2 .001*** .001* .001** .000
~.000! ~.000! ~.000! ~.001!
Opp, no portfolio 1.548*** 2.312*** 1.431** 1.965**
~.236! ~.635! ~.669! ~.781!
Opp, Other portfolioa 1.863*** 2.605*** 3.169*** 4.176***
~.208! ~.592! ~.577! ~.898!
Opp, Topic portfoliob 1.300* 1.992*** 2.829***
~.665! ~.589! ~.759!
Govt, no portfolio .624*** .617*** .731*** .619**
~.107! ~.203! ~.252! ~.314!
32nd Parliament 1.250*** 1.443*** 2.188***
~.326! ~.271! ~.411!
34th Parliament .773*** .123 1.211***
~.244! ~.223! ~.283!
35th Parliament .218 .182 1.376***
~.343! ~.349! ~.502!
36th Parliament .056 .642* 1.471***
~.364! ~.343! ~.482!
37th Parliament .394 .915** 2.041***
~.371! ~.356! ~.534!
Party—PC .427 .719*** .867**
~.274! ~.261! ~.370!
Party—NDP .013 .585 .006
~.393! ~.372! ~.426!
Party—Reform .738* .658 2.476***
~.443! ~.501! ~.784!
Party—BQ .865* .625 1.115**
~.463! ~.506! ~.524!
Constant .232** 3.736*** 4.027*** 3.035***
~.113! ~.366! ~.354! ~.504!
Log likelihood 6560.372 1979.672 1920.676 854.436
N 1804 1804 1804 1804
Cells contain coefficients from a negative binomial regression model, with standard errors in parentheses.
*p , .10, **p , .05, ***p , .01.
aColumn 1: any portfolio; column 2: any portfolio other than defense; column 3: any non-economic portfo-
lio; column 4: any portfolio not related to social welfare.
bColumn 2: defense portfolio; column 3: economic portfolio; column 4: social welfare portfolio.
Constituency Influence in Parliament 579
55.1.37 Beyond this size, the benefits for an individual MP begin to drop.
With a party making up 50 per cent of the Opposition, the expected count
drops to 50.2, and with 60 per cent the expected count is 39.6. An MP in
a party that forms 60 per cent of the Opposition is thus likely to ask no
more questions—indeed, fewer questions—than the same MP in a party
that forms 20 per cent of the Opposition, ceteris paribus.
Win margin is also significant and in the expected direction. The
greater the win margin, that is, the lower the electoral instability, the fewer
questions a member asks. Alternatively, the tighter the race, or the greater
the electoral instability, the more questions a member asks. A one-standard
deviation shift in win margin ~.18! leads to an average 12.3 per cent
decrease in the expected number of questions. ~This translates to a shift
from roughly 13.9 to 12.1 oral questions by an MP in a given Parlia-
ment, ceteris paribus, and holding other variables at their means.!38 This
first model thus provides preliminary evidence that electoral instability
matters; moreover, that there is a degree of active representation in the
Canadian parliament. MPs participate more when they face more com-
petition in the next election.
Dyadic representation is addressed more directly in columns 2 through
4 of Table 2, which show models of the number of defense, debt0taxes and
welfare questions, including the party and parliamentary controls, as well
as the constituency interests variable interacted with win margin. In each
case, the effects of Government versus Opposition and portfolio versus
backbencher status are still significant and in the expected direction. Oppo-
sition portfolios increase the expected count; this is particularly true for
portfolios on the specific topic in each model.
Party and Parliament variables are somewhat difficult to interpret in
these models. The NDP coefficient in column 3, for instance, shows the
difference between the NDP and the comparison category, Liberals, hold-
ing everything else constant. ~The coefficient is .795, based on the expo-
nentiated coefficient, an NDP MP asks roughly 2.2 times the expected
number of debt0taxes questions as a Liberal MP.! But of course other
things are not held constant in real life. The NDP has never had as large
a seat share in Parliament, they have never formed a federal government,
and at the constituency level they tend to win by smaller margins, so we
cannot take party dummies themselves as good indications of the real
difference between one party and another. Party differences do show up
nicely in predictions, however, below.
The preference variables, combined with win margin, are the criti-
cal test of dyadic representation. And note that they have a good deal to
overcome: these models test for a significant effect of these variables,
even after parliaments, parties, and other institutional variables are taken
into account. Indeed, we expect these variables to be significant even
after we control for portfolios. In short, we expect constituency variables
580 STUART SOROKA, ERIN PENNER AND KELLY BLIDOOK
to have an effect above and beyond party and institutional variables. This
is of course the crux of active, dyadic representation.
In column 2 ~and as we should expect given results in Table 1!, the
binary military base variable is positive and significant. The ~exponenti-
ated! coefficient suggests that having a military base increases the expected
count for defense questions by 83 per cent. We expect no particular direct
effect of win margin here, and do not find one. The interaction between
win margin and the defense base variable is negative as expected ~weak-
ening the link between constituency and parliamentary behaviour!, but
insignificant.
Results for debt0taxes in column 3 also suggest a link between con-
stituency interests—measured here using the partisan preference
measure—and MP behaviour. A one-standard deviation ~.15! rightward
~positive! shift in partisan preference leads to a 72 per cent increase in
the expected count. Again, there is no direct effect of win margin, but
the interaction is in this case is both negative and significant. A similar
~though opposite! dynamic is apparent for questions on welfare, in the
last column of Table 1. Here, a one-standard deviation ~.15! leftward
~negative! shift in the partisan preference measure leads to a 48 per cent
increase in the expected count for welfare questions. The interaction
with win margin is correctly signed, but narrowly misses statistical
significance.
There is thus evidence of dyadic representation in every case in
Table 1, first, in the relationship between win margin and an MP’s pro-
pensity to ask questions at all, and then in the consistent relationship
between measures of constituency interests and MPs’ questions on three
different topics. The interaction between win margin and constituency
interest is in the correct direction in each of the issue-specific models,
though it is statistically significant only in the case of debt0taxes questions.
The resulting combined effect of partisan preference and win mar-
gin for debt0taxes is illustrated in Figure 1; for welfare, results are illus-
trated in Figure 2. The figures show expected counts ~of questions! over
varying levels of constituency partisan preference. Rather than holding
other variables constant at their means, the figures show estimates for
two real-world examples: Reform0CA and NDP—two parties at oppo-
site ends of the political spectrum and consistently in the Opposition—
backbenchers in the 36th Parliament.39 The figures show expected counts
only for the range of partisan preference in the constituencies in which
Reform or NDP candidates were elected. In our data, NDP candidates
were elected in constituencies with an overall partisan preferences score
of between .4 and 0; Reform0CA candidates were elected in constitu-
encies with a score of between 0 and .6.
The mediating effect of electoral instability is captured in Figures 1
and 2 by showing the effect of partisan preference at two different values
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for win margin. Under “minimal winning conditions,” win margin is held
at .03, a win by 3 per cent of the vote share, the 10th percentile for win
margin in our sample. Under “maximal winning conditions,” win margin
is held at .50, a win by 50 per cent of the vote share, about the 90th
percentile in our sample. The figures thus capture the estimated effects
of party, constituency interests and electoral instability.
In Figure 1, we see the number of debt0taxes questions increase as
constituency interests move rightward.40 A combination of party, and
the interests of those constituencies in which NDP candidates are actu-
ally elected, means that NDP MPs rarely ask questions on debt0taxes.
Reform0CA MPs do ask such questions, and both maximally and min-
imally winning Reform0CA MPs ask more questions when their constit-
uency is more clearly to the right. Under minimal winning conditions,
there is an especially strong link between constituency interests and MPs’
questions on debt and taxes.
Figure 2 shows a similar dynamic, though in the opposite direction.
MPs from more left-leaning constituencies ask more questions on wel-
fare; that said, no Reform MPs are elected from these constituencies,
and that party’s MPs accordingly rarely ask welfare questions. NDP can-
didates facing greater electoral instability appear more greatly affected
by constituency interests. This is the expected effect, though recall that
in this case the interaction is insignificant.
FIGURE 1
Constituency Interests, Electoral Pressure and Questions on Debt0Taxes
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Conclusions
Miller and Stokes write that, “Substantial constituency influence over
the lower house of Congress is commonly thought to be both a norma-
tive principle and a factual truth of American government” ~1963: 45!.
The same cannot be said for most parliamentary systems, where the link
between constituencies’ interests and the behaviour of their respective
representatives is typically muted by party discipline. The commonly
accepted truth is that these systems are dominated by strong party gov-
ernment and leave little space for independent, constituency-responsive
action by elected representatives.
There are nevertheless good reasons to believe that at least a certain
degree of dyadic representation will be evident outside the US. The “nor-
mative principle” of constituency influence is built into SMP electoral
systems, after all. And while it is true that in parliamentary systems leg-
islation necessarily comes out of cabinet, there exist parliamentary ven-
ues in which individual MPs can have an effect on legislative deliberations,
and possibly an effect on legislative outcomes ~or other policy outcomes;
see Blidook, N.d.!. In a country with an SMP electoral system ~such as
Canada!, and a parliamentary venue in which representatives have at least
some freedom in their legislative behaviour ~such as Question Period!,
limited dyadic representation seems possible, and even likely.
FIGURE 2
Constituency Interests, Electoral Pressure and Questions on Welfare
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These are the principal contributions of this paper, we hope: in Can-
ada, reviving the notion that individual MPs can matter in the Canadian
political process and suggesting the potential representative importance
of Question Period, and, comparatively speaking, confirming the fact
that there can be an element of dyadic legislative representation in a
party-centred parliamentary system. It goes without saying that future
work is required to more precisely identify the relationship between con-
stituency interests and the legislative behaviour of representatives, across
both countries and issues. For the time being, we are content to provide
preliminary evidence that this kind of representation exists. The Amer-
ican Congress may be exceptional where the magnitude of dyadic rep-
resentation is concerned, but the institutional incentives for dyadic
representation, and that representation itself, are clearly evident else-
where. The questions MPs ask in the Canadian Parliament are, for
instance, above and beyond partisan affiliation, regularly driven by con-
stituency characteristics.
Notes
1 Also see Weale ~1999!.
2 This system-level notion of representation has motivated a vast body of literature in
the US, Canada, and elsewhere. See, for example, Page and Shapiro ~1983!; Erik-
son et al. ~2002!; Wlezien ~1995, 1996, 2004!; Soroka and Wlezien ~2004, 2005!;
Petry ~1999!; Petry and Mendelsohn ~2004!. For a review of different forms of
representation—system and otherwise—see, for example, Mansbridge ~2003!; Wlez-
ien and Soroka ~2007!.
3 See, for example, Achen ~1978!; Bartels ~1991!; Erikson ~1978, 1990!; Erikson and
Wright ~1980, 1997, 2000!; Fiorina ~1974!; Kuklinski ~1977, 1978!; McCrone and
Kuklinski ~1979!; Shapiro et al. ~1990!; Stone ~1979!; Wright ~1989a; 1989b!; Wright
and Berkman ~1986!. For an opposing perspective see Bernstein ~1989!.
4 Indeed, in recent years Canadian governments have gone so far as to use confidence
measures to ensure favorable vote outcomes in the House, raising rather serious prob-
lems for the process of responsible government.
5 Using the Canadian Election Study, Blais et al. ~2003! suggest that as much as 5 per
cent of the vote in the 2000 Canadian federal election ~outside Quebec! was deter-
mined by voter preferences for individual candidates rather than parties.
6 On the UK, see also Mitchell ~1994! and Rush ~2001!.
7 Indeed, research on constituency service, following in large part from Fenno’s influ-
ential work ~1978!, has much to tell us about the extent to which MPs, across various
electoral systems, may focus on constituency interests and priorities. See, for exam-
ple, Anagnoson ~1983!; Gaines ~1998!; Ingall and Crisp ~2001!; Norris ~1997!; Stud-
lar and McAllister ~1996!.
8 The same is true of most political systems, of course, including the US. See, for exam-
ple, Highton and Rocca’s work ~2005! on position taking by Members of Congress.
9 For a discussion of the development and process of Question Period in the Canadian
House of Commons, see also Penner et al. ~2006!.
10 For instance, the Reform Party’s oral questions, which asked for clarification on future
scenarios involving unclear referendum questions and secession terms ~alongside a
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Reform private members bill on these issues, the Quebec Contingency Act!, is often
credited as having inspired the Clarity Act ~1999!. See, for example, Hébert ~2002!.
There are also multiple cases where ministers have resigned or been shuffled in which
QP activity appears to have been a factor in the outcome, including, most recently,
Rona Ambrose and Gordon O’Connor.
11 This figure is based on a search of the Globe and Mail in the Factiva full-text data-
base. Note that we use the Globe and Mail as just one example here, though we
expect content to be similar in many other Canadian dailies. ~A parallel search of
both the Toronto Star and the Calgary Herald suggests that this is the case.! The
search itself is: ^^~“question period” or “oral questions” or “questions in the House”!
not “CTV’s Question Period”&&, where the latter term ensures that we exclude events
from the CTV program of the same name, and where the search is constrained to
stories identified by Factiva as being about Canada.
12 These figures are based on the 173 Opposition MPs currently in Parliament, and
exclude the party leaders and Speaker. Note that there is a good deal of variance
across parties. Currently, 90 per cent of NDP candidates have websites and 96 per
cent of those list oral questions; 83 per cent of Liberal MPs have websites with 59
per cent listing questions; 30 per cent of BQ candidates have websites with 85 per
cent listing questions. This is just a simple descriptive test of the role of Question
Period in constituency communication, of course, and cannot speak directly to the
role of questions in constituency communication in the mid-1980s. That said, it does
offer at least one recent picture of the role oral questions play in MPs’ communica-
tion strategies. Websites were checked in the third week of July 2008, based on links
from the parliamentary list of MPs at http:00webinfo.parl.gc.ca0.
13 Unlike many systems, for instance, neither the question nor its topic need be submit-
ted to the minister in advance ~Marleau and Montpetit, 2000: ch. 11!.
14 Based in part on personal interviews with current and past members of Parliament, as
listed in the acknowledgements. For a similar story from UK MPs, see Norton ~1994!.
15 For the Canadian project, several codes were adjusted to reflect Canadian rather
than US policies ~for example, Canada Pension Plan!, and several others were added
to accommodate uniquely Canadian political issues ~for example, National Unity!.
A list of Canadian topic codes is available from the authors. The dataset was coded
manually, directly from Hansard, using six different coders over a two-year period.
Coders went through a three-month training process before they started storing data;
a random selection of questions was coded by all coders on a monthly basis. Inter-
coder reliability for topics was very high—after training, all coders agreed on a
single major topic 95 per cent of the time, and a single minor topic 85 per cent of
the time. For further details on methodology, see Penner et al. ~2006! as well as the
datacodebookavailableonlineviathePolicyAgendasProjectwebsite~www.policyagendas.
org!.
16 In the Policy Agendas codebook, these categories correspond to the following codes:
defense, topic 16; debt0deficit, subtopic 105; taxation, subtopic 107; social welfare,
subtopics 1301–1305.
17 First, taxes were prominent in the Mulroney Conservative Governments ~both tax
reduction and the new Goods and Services Tax!, and then tax and debt reduction
became the central issues for Reform0CA. Note also that combining federal debt0
deficit and taxes has the statistical advantage of increasing the range and variance in
this dependent variable ~and, in particular, reducing the number of zeros!.
18 When MPs are in multiple parliaments, they appear several times in our dataset. This
raises a problem for regression estimations, of course, since the cases are not com-
pletely independent of each other. This is accounted for in part by using robust stan-
dard errors, where the total number of MPs, rather than the sample size, is used in
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the estimation of standard errors. Note that another simple approach to dealing with
interdependencies is simply to keep just one instance of each MP. Doing so has no
substantive effect on results, so we proceed with the full model ~and robust standard
errors! here.
19 These data exhibit a good degree of “overdispersion,” —where the standard error is
greater than the mean—so the NBRM is more appropriate than the more common
Poisson count data estimation. We also ran models using a zero-inflated negative
binomial ~ZINB! estimation. Since results did not change substantively, we rely on
the simpler procedure here.
20 There are several texts offering very clear discussions of NBRMs. See, for example,
Cameron and Trivedi ~1998!; Hilbe ~2007!; Long and Freese ~2003!.
21 Note that in most cases the subscript i for t does not really matter—t is constant for
most MPs in a given Parliament p. We subscript for i here only for the rare cases in
which an MP enters late or leaves early.
22 This error terms is distributed as a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance a,
parameterized as ln a.
23 Note that t appears on both sides of the equation but does not cancel out. It is not
static, after all, but varies across individuals even within parliaments. Indeed, this is
why we subscript for both i and p for t—the subscript i would be redundant ~that is,
t would vary only across p! were it not for the rare cases in which an MP enters late
or leaves early.
24 Note that none of these questions will be asked by members with major portfolios.
Those senior members of the cabinet will not ask any oral questions.
25 Note that the Reform Party existed only for the 1993 and 1997 elections. In 2000,
Reform changed its name to the Canadian Alliance and then merged in 2003 with much
of the Progressive Conservative Party to become the Conservative Party of Canada.
26 An alternative is to use a census measure of, for example, median household income
as a surrogate for constituency preferences in these models. Income data are not readily
available at the federal electoral district level before the 1991 Census, however, leav-
ing missing data for well over half our sample.
27 More precisely, on a 20-point left-right scale, Benoit and Laver place the parties as
follows: NDP 4.93; BQ 7.2; Liberal 11.08; PC 13.6; Reform 17.46.
28 The average left-right score for parties in the 1984–1997 elections is NDP 31.9;
BQ ~unavailable!; Liberal 6.4; PC 16.45; Reform ~1997 only! 40.5. These data put
Reform a little further to the right, then, but this is relatively early in the party’s
existence. Over time, the PC’s left-right score is as follows: in 1988, 18.3; in 1993,
24.6; in 1997 ~with the electoral rise of the Reform Party!, 10.6.
29 2000 Canadian Election Study ~Blais et al., 2004! respondents were asked, “Some
people talk about parties being on the left or on the right. Do you think the @party
name# is on the left, on the right, or in the centre?” The “net” score for each party
% saying right minus % saying left was: NDP 24.7; BQ 11.3; Liberal 9.8; Con-
servative 20.5; Canadian Alliance ~Reform! 27.4. Of course, these figures are not
directly comparable with the interval-level measures in work on manifestos or elite
interviews. Here, we have respondents selecting just one of three broad categories,
within which there will be much unobserved variance in ideological placements. None-
theless, results do correspond roughly with the other indicators.
30 Note that two quite different distributions can lead to same partisan preference value:
everyone voting Liberal, or 50 per cent voting left and the other 50 per cent voting
right, lead to the same result, for instance. The measure nevertheless captures the
median voter in each case.
31 We did experiment with other versions of partisan preference, scoring, for instance,
the BQ as 1.5 rather than 1, and so on. The changes in specification have only a
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minor impact on the results, so we use what we believe to be the closest approxima-
tion of existing party placement measures here.
32 Another is to control for an MP’s own demographic traits and experience. MPs’ pre-
vious occupations are available from the Library of Parliament, for instance. These
are not clearly related to attentiveness to particular issues, however. We chose not to
deal with this directly here, though this is certainly an avenue for future analysis.
33 The different is significant at p , .01, based on a one-tailed t-test.
34 The different is significant at p , .01, based on a one-tailed t-test.
35 The different is statistically significant at p  .08, based on a one-tailed t-test.
36 Results in Table 1 use all MPs, including Government members who ask very few
questions. To ensure that results—particularly where party size is concerned—are
not being driven by the inclusion of these Government MPs; we estimated the same
model with only Opposition MPs. Doing so makes little difference to these institu-
tional variables, so we show the full model here.
37 These estimates are generated using the Clarify routine in STATA. See King et al.
~2000!.
38 Holding other variables at their means provides a useful shortcut here, but is admit-
tedly rather peculiar when independent variables include a series of dummy variables
for which anything other than 0 or 1 is impossible. We avoid this problem in the sim-
ulations below by specifying specific and realistic values for all variables in the model.
39 Party, parliament, and party size variables are thus fixed at the appropriate levels.
40 For the sake of clarity of presentation, the figures show predicted values without
margins of error. Also, because we show predictions for very particular cases ~NDP
and Reform 36th Parliament backbenchers!, the margins of error around the esti-
mates are considerably larger than predictions that simply hold all other variables at
their mean. The coefficients in Table 1, of course, provide indications of statistical
significance across the entire sample.
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